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ALLOCATION OF BACK-PAY LIABILITY FOR
VIOLATION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
JOHN V. JANSONIUS*
In recent years, federal courts have devoted considerable attention
to the allocation of back-pay liability' between union and employer
when both are at fault for wrongdoing against an individual employee
or class of employees. This issue typically has arisen in two contexts.
First, an employee who has been wrongfully treated under a collective
bargaining agreement may file an action pursuant to section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 2 alleging breach of con-
tract by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by
the union.' Second, an employee who has been the victim of unlawful
discrimination in employment4 may sue both the employer and the
© 1983 John V. Jansonius
* B.A., 1977, Drake; J.D., 1980, Southern Methodist. Member, State Bar of Texas, State
Bar of Minnesota, American Bar Association. Associate, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Tex.-Ed.
1. Lost wages are the most common form of damages sought by employees who have been
unlawfully treated by an employer or union, and therefore back pay is the most appropriate
monetary relief. Back pay first became available as a remedy for unfair labor practices in § 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Since then, back pay has gen-
erally been available to remedy injuries caused by any unlawful conduct of employers. For a
thorough discussion concerning the availability and computation of back pay in the employment
discrimination context, see Special Project, Back Pay in Employment Discrimination Cases, 35
VAND. L. REV. 893 (1982).
2. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
3. Labor unions are required to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit, both
in negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement. The "duty of fair rep-
resentation" was first enunciated in Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944),
and has evolved through a long line of Supreme Court decisions. See Sear v. Cadillac Auto. Co.,
501 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1981). Breach of the duty of fair
representation must be proved by evidence of arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct by
the union. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119 (1973). The mechanics involved in an
unfair representation lawsuit under § 301 are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 106 to
117.
4. The general antidiscrimination laws in the United States are Title VII of the Civil Rights
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union on the theory that they were mutually responsible for the
wrongful discrimination.'
In both situations, the employer and the union must each be
culpable for wrongdoing against the employee in order to be held
liable,6 but apportionment of damages7 between employer and union
may vary, depending on the source of the employee's substantive
right.' Part I of this article will discuss union liability for back pay in
actions based on violation of the duty of fair representation in negotia-
tion and administration of the labor contract and in actions based on
violation of federal statutory rights. Part II will discuss apportionment
of back pay between employer and union, comparing the approaches
to apportionment under the LMRA and civil rights statutes. Part III
focuses on the role of contribution in actions when there is mutual
employer and union responsibility for wrongdoing. The thesis of this
article is that liability should be apportioned among employers and
unions according to fault, and that an employer or union held liable
for damages in excess of actual fault should be entitled to contribution
from the other party to the labor contract.
I. Union Liability for Back Pay
There has never been serious doubt that an employer is liable for
lost wages attributable to its own breach of contract or unlawful
discrimination for the simple reason that employers pay wages and
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-17 (1982), and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
5. An employee also may join both employer and union in a discrimination case when both
parties may be necessary for complete relief, even though one of the parties may not be liable for
any wrongful act. See, e.g., Townsend v. Exxon Co., 420 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1976) (union
joined as necessary party where plaintiff sought reinstatement with seniority despite lack of any
allegations of wrongdoing against union).
6. The standard for employer liability in § 301 actions by individual employees is breach of
the applicable collective bargaining agreement. Unions will be liable under § 301 only for breach
of the duty of fair representation. See infra notes 86 to 107 and accompanying text. The stan-
dards governing union or employer liability under the employment discrimination laws cannot be
readily summarized, but it is safe to say that neither union nor employer will be found liable for
unlawful employment discrimination without some degree of participation in a decision, policy,
or practice resulting in unlawful discrimination. See generally W. DIEDRICH & W. GAUS,
DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS (1982).
7. Unless stated otherwise, damages in this article will refer solely to back pay.
8. Frequently the employee's actual injury will be the same regardless of whether relief is
sought for breach of the labor contract or for violation of federal employment discrimination
laws. That is, an improperly discharged employee loses wages regardless of the reason for dis-
charge. Similarly, an employee unlawfully denied a promotion on account of race or national




19831 ALLOCATION OF BACK-PA Y LIABILITY
salaries.9 Unions, however, act as employee representatives and can
only indirectly cause loss of income to an employee."0 Moreover,
because a union has a duty to represent the interests of a majority of
its members," an award of back pay against the union to a single
employee or a group of minority employees conflicts with the
majority's interest in having a financially strong union. Finally, when
an employee is awarded back pay against the union, that employee
must indirectly subsidize the award as must other innocent dues-paying
members.' I The different roles performed by employer and union have
led to a great deal of uncertainty and inconsistency in case law as to
union liability for back pay.
Union Liability for Back Pay Based on Employer
Breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act as allowing employees to enforce their
rights under a collective bargaining agreement in both state and federal
courts.'3 At the same time, the Supreme Court has attached conditions
to this right that are designed to promote the resolution of labor
disputes through contractual grievance procedures.4 Before a section
9. See, e.g., Youngdahl, Suggestions for Labor Unions Faced with Liability under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 ARK. L. REV. 631, 646 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 209-10
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Youngdahl, supra note 9, at 646.
11. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Nyquest, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979); Sear v. Cadillac Auto.
Co., 501 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 4 (Ist Cir. 1931).
12. The commentator making this point also argued that bargaining unit employees displaced
by reinstated victims of past discrimination should not be required to contribute directly or in-
directly to a back-pay award. Youngdahl, supra note 9, at 646. This reasoning is suspect, be-
cause the duty of fair representation is owed to all employees in the bargaining unit, including
employees who do not belong to the union and do not pay dues. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Del Casal
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. 'Boss Mfg., 107 F.2d 574 (7th
Cir. 1939).
13. Section 301 provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). See Courtney v. Charles Box Co., 368 U.S. 502
(1962); Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 215 So. 2d 1466 (Miss.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974 (1969).
14. As a general proposition, an employee is not entitled to maintain an action under § 301
unless he has exhausted his contractual remedies and had been denied fair representation by the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
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301 action may be maintained, an employee must show that the union
did not fairly represent him in the contractual grievance procedure."
This requirement means that an employer will rarely be liable to an
employee under section 301 without some measure of wrongdoing by
the union.' 6
Notwithstanding that unfair union representation is a necessary ele-
ment of section 301 actions, federal courts have historically been
uncertain about union liability for back pay under section 301. This
uncertainty has coexisted for several years with repeated recognition
by the courts that unions may be liable for some damages attributable
to breach of the duty of fair representation. Reluctance by the United
States Supreme Court to articulate the elements of damages available
against the union for unfair representation was most notably il-
lustrated in Vaca v. Sipes.7 Although the Court was not directly
presented with the question of union liability for back pay in Vaca,I8 it
stated that breach of the duty of fair representation could give rise to
union liability for damages:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the
employer and the union according to the damages caused by the
fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer's
breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but in-
creases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to
process the grievance should not be charged to the employer.'9
union. The exceptions to this rule were summarized by the court in Rabalais v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1978):
An employee who claims a violation by his employer of the collective bargaining
agreement is bound by the terms of that agreement as to the method of enforcing
his claim. Ordinarily, he must exhaust the remedies provided in that agreement,
but he may bring suit without exhaustion if he can fit within one of the three
exceptions to this general rule. No exhaustion is necessary if: (1) the union
wrongfully refuses to process the employee's grievance, (2) the employer's conduct
amounts to a repudiation of the remedial procedures specified in the contract, thus
violating its duty of fair representation, or (3) exhaustion of contractual remedies
would be futile because the aggrieved employee would have to submit his claim to
a group "which is in large part chosen by the [employer and union] against whom
[his] real complaint is made." [Citations omitted.]
15. See infra notes 107 to 117 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion concern-
ing the mechanics of an unfair representation suit under § 301.
16. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Czosek v. O'Mara,
397 U.S. 25 (1970); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
17. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
18. In Vaca the Supreme Court announced that breach of the duty of fair representation
must be proved by evidence of "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on part of the Union.. . ." Id. at
193. Under this standard, the Court held that the union was not liable for breach of the duty of
fair representation. Id. at 194.
19. Id. at 197-98.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/2
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The Court did not explain exactly what form of damages is assessable
against a union under section 301.20
Three years later, in Czosek v. O'Mara,2 the Court focused on
union liability for breach of its duty of fair representation by failing to
process grievances filed by a group of improperly discharged
employees. Relying on dicta in Vaca that the employer's breach of
contract is the primary cause of damages to employees in section 301
suits,2 2 the Court refused to extend back-pay liability to the union.
The Court stated:
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of
any discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent
discriminatory refusal by the union to process grievances based on
the discharge, damages against the union for loss of employment
are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the
grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from
the employer.
23
Until last Term, the Court did little to clarify the scope of union
liability under section 30124 and the lower courts reached different
results on the issue of back-pay liability.25
20. The Vaca court did not decide whether a union could be held liable for back pay in a
§ 301 action, but the court suggested back pay was inappropriate due to the financial hardship
that would result to the union and the primary liability of the employer. Id. at 196-97.
21. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
22. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 196-97. See supra note 20.
23. Czosek, 397 U.S. at 29.
24. In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court reiterated that
unions are liable for damages for failure to fairly represent a discharged employee, but the Court
once again did not delineate the scope of union liability. Justice Stewart, however, did state that
a union could be liable for back pay:
If an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision, then his
failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be anything but rightful, until
there is a contrary determination. Liability for the intervening wage loss must fall
not on the employer but on the union. Such an apportionment of damages is man-
dated by Vaca's holding that "damages attributable solely to the employer's
breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those
damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be
charged to the employer ... ." To hold an employer liable for back wages for the
period during which he rightfully refuses to rehire discharged employees would be
to charge him with a contractual violation on the basis of conduct precisely in ac-
cord with the dictates of the collective agreement. [Citation omitted.]
Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court also discussed union liability under the principles
of Vaca in IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) (union not liable for punitive damages in § 301
suit) and in Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (comparison of internal union procedures and
remedies with remedies available to employees in § 301 suits).
25. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982) (employer liable for all
back pay); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1982) (same); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (same); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291 (1st Cir.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
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To clarify this uncertainty, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Bowen v. United States Postal Service.26 In Bowen, the Fourth Circuit
had sustained a verdict" in favor of an employee who was discharged
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and denied fair
representation by the union in processing his grievance,28 but reversed
the lower court's assignment of back-pay liability to both the employer
and union. Despite the jury's finding the union was partially at fault
for the employee's loss of income,29 the circuit court reasoned that
"[a]s Bowen's compensation was at all times payable only by the Ser-
vice, reimbursement of his lost earnings continued to be the obligation
of the Service exclusively. Hence, no portion of the deprivations...
was chargeable to the Union."30 Interestingly, the circuit court did not
increase the amount of damages by the amount of lost income the jury
attributed to the union's breach of duty of fair representation.,'
In the Supreme Court's first direct response to the issue of union
liability for back pay under section 301, a five-member majority
reversed the Fourth Circuit and held the Postal Workers' Union liable
for lost wages caused by its breach of the duty of fair representation.2
Underlying the Court's decision was the belief that the federal policy
1978) (attorney's fees properly apportioned between union and employer, but employer solely
liable for back pay). Compare Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978)
(remanded for determination of damages in view of employer's reliance on results of
arbitration); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating in dictum that
union may be liable for back pay); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ala.
1977) (employer and union each liable for half of back pay and back pension payments);
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (back-pay
liability apportioned between employer and union according to sequence and degree of wrongful
act).
26. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
27. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982), the jury sat only in an advisory capacity with
regard to the United States Postal Service because it is an agency of the federal government. The
district court followed the jury's advice.
28. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981).
29. For the text of the district court's instructions to the jury, see supra note 169.
30. 642 F.2d at 82, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
31. Id. at 82 n.6. Although the circuit court indicated that it might have revised the judgment
to award full back pay against the employer if Bowen had cross-appealed against the Postal Ser-
vice, the Supreme Court noted that Bowen was in any event entitled to the full amount of
damages awarded and that a cross-appeal was not necessary to revise the damages award.
Bowen, 103 S.Ct. at 592 n.7.
32. Bowen, 103 S.Ct. at 599. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Stevens. Justice White
concurred in the judgment, but dissented to the assignment of partial back-pay liability to the
union. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in the minority opinion without reservation.
Justice Rehnquist joined in the minority opinion except as to its opinion that damages against
the Postal Service should be increased to the full amount of lost income despite plaintiff's failure
to cross-appeal.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/2
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of encouraging private resolution of labor disputes33 would be better
served by subjecting both parties to the grievance procedure to liability
for back pay. Justice Powell explained:
The principle announced in Vaca reflects this allocation of respon-
sibilities in the grievance procedure-a procedure that con-
templates that both employer and union will perform their respec-
tive obligations. In the absence of damages apportionment where
the default of both parties contributes to the employee's injury,
incentives to comply with the grievance procedure will be
diminished. Indeed, imposing total liability solely on the employer
could well affect the willingness of employers to agree to arbitra-
tion clauses as they are customarily written.3 4
Moreover, an employer has a right to rely on the results of the
grievance procedure, which necessarily implies union liability for con-
duct resulting in "malfunction" of that procedure.35 Thus, sixteen
years after announcing "the governing principle" concerning appor-
tionment of damages in section 301 suits,3 6 the Supreme Court has
finally decided that damages in the form of back pay may be awarded
against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation.7
Union Liability for Back Pay in Actions Based
on Violations of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws
Title VII
In contrast to section 301 of the LMRA, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196438 expressly provides that unions, as well as
33. The policy of encouraging resolution of labor disputes through private means was most
emphatically set forth by the Supreme Court in 1960 in a series of cases that have come to be
known as the Steelworker's Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
34. 103 S. Ct. at 597 n.15.
35. Id.
36. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967) ("The governing principle, then, is to apportion
liability between the employer and union according to damage caused by the fault of each.").
37. In Bowen the court did not hold that the union was exclusively liable for damages caused
by breach of the duty of fair representation. Although the union is "primarily" liable for
damages caused by its breach, the employer may nevertheless be required to pay the full amount
of the back-pay award. 103 S.Ct. at 595 n.12. Presumably, the union also is subject to a full
liability and both the employer and union would be entitled to contribution for payment of
damages exceeding their respective degree of fault. For discussion of the basis for apportioning
damages after Bowen, see infra notes 164-183 and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-l) to ex-
clude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any in-
1983]
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employers, may be held liable for back pay for unlawful discrimina-
tion.3" The courts have had no difficulty holding labor unions liable
for back-pay awards for Title VII violations.40 A back-pay award
against a union most commonly results from its role in negotiating and
administering discriminatory seniority and promotion provisions.4'
Other union practices creating back-pay liability under Title VII in-
clude discriminatory membership or referral practices'  and the
dividual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify
or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would
limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
39. Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(g) (1982) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue
from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission.
40. In EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n, Steanfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1976), a union found to have engaged in discriminatory referral practices
argued that it was not subject to back-pay liability, citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975). In the alternative, the union argued that it should be exempted from an award
of back pay because of its poor financial condition. The appellate court rejected the union's
argument that it was per se exempt from back-pay liability, citing § 706(g), and held that the
union's claim of financial inability to pay the back-pay award was properly left to the district
court's discretion. 542 F.2d at 579, 586. See also Ingram v. Madison Square Gardens Center,
Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
41. See generally Note, Union Liability under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68
GEO. L.J. 959 (1980); Note, Union Liability For Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV.
702 (1980). See, e.g., Jackson v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (l1th Cir. 1982)
(discriminatory promotion system); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir.
1980), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (local union and international
union liable for effects of discriminatory seniority system); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (discriminatory seniority system); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (discriminatory seniority
system); Bennett v. Central Tel. Co., 545 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (discriminatory job bid
procedure). For a discussion of the legality of seniority systems under § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1982), see Note, Employment Discrimination and the Seniority System Exceptions:
American Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 36 Sw. L.J. 1039 (1982).
42. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n, Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1976) (discrimination in membership and referral practices); Ingram
v. Madison Square Gardens, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discriminatory referral
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/2
19831 ALLOCATION OF BACK-PA Y LIABILITY 753
maintenance of segregated locals. 3 Finally, some courts have con-
strued the duty of fair representation to encompass a duty to affir-
matively resist Title VII violations by an employer." Nevertheless, two
commentators41 have noted that the element of causation necessary for
union liability under Title VI4 suggests that a union should not be
liable for employer actions not sanctioned by the collective bargaining
agreement unless the union's failure to oppose discrimination by the
employer is attributable to unlawful motivations.47
Section 1981
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 186641 protects the right of
all persons in the United States to "make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws .... " This language was virtually ignored during its- first century
of existence,49 but in the 1970s section 1981 was rediscovered and in-
practices); Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp.
329 (E.D. Pa. 1978) rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982) (discriminatory hiring hall system).
43. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated in part on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Sears v. Bennett, 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982); Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980);
Sinyard v. Foote & Davies Div., 577 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1978); Donnell v. General Motors Corp.,
576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct 97 (1982); EEOC v. Detroit-Edison Co.,
515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975) vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc.,
478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. f973). But see Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir.
1974); Kinard v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
45. Note, Union Liability Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEo. L.J. 959
(1980); Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 702 (1980).
46. Section 703(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1982), provides:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which could deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities, or would limit such employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
47. See e.g., Bennett v. Central Tele. Co., 545 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
49. An early Supreme Court decision is largely responsible for the historical apathy toward
§ 1981. In Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Court held that the thirteenth amend-
ment proscribed only involuntary servitude. Since § 1981 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment, Hodges severely limited the applicability of § 1981. Id. at 18-19. Section 1981 was
further limited in 1948 by a Supreme Court decision inserting a state-action requirement into
§ 1981. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413
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terpreted to proscribe discrimination in private employment."0 To
remedy violations of section 1981 by private employers, the circuit
courts have uniformly held that an award of back pay is appropriate."'
In one of the earliest reported decisions discussing liability under
section 1981 for discrimination in private employment, Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works,2 the Seventh Circuit held that a union, as well
as an employer, is subject to liability for back pay.3 Soon after
Waters,54 the Fifth Circuit held in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co." that a union may be held liable for back pay under both Title
VII and section 1981 as a result of its assent to a discriminatory labor
contract.56 Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly discuss the
overlap of Title VII and section 1981, its discussion of union back-pay
liability suggests that, for the most part, the same principles govern
union back-pay liability under both statutes.7 There are no reported
decisions holding that labor unions are not subject to an award of
back pay under section 1981.
Equal Pay Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Union liability for back pay under the Equal Pay Act (EPA)8 and
(1968), the Supreme Court overruled this narrow interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
holding that a private realtor violated § 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by refusing to sell a
home on account of the prospective buyer's race.
50. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See generally Special
Project, Back Pay in Employment Discrimination Cases, 35 VAND. L. REV. 895, 911-14 (1982).
51. See Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976);
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972). See also Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as
moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
52. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
53. Id. at 1321.
54. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
997 (1976).
55. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
56. See also Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975) vacated, 431 U.S.
951 (1977). The plaintiffs in Johnson sought the same relief under Title VII and § 1981 and the
court considered both statutes simultaneously throughout its opinion.
57. Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1381-82. Notwithstanding the Johnson court's interpretation of
§ 1981 and Title VII as imposing the same requirements for back-pay liability, it must be
remembered that back pay under Title VII is available only for a 2-year period. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(j) (1982). This limitation period has been held inapplicable in actions under § 1981.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Local
788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) provides:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/2
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 59 is a more dif-
ficult issue than union back-pay liability under section 1981 or Title
VII because the remedial procedures for violation of the EPA and the
ADEA are incorporated into the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).6"
In contrast to Title VII," the FLSA exempts labor unions from
liability in minimun wage or overtime pay actions by individual
employees.62 As a result, union back-pay liability for violations of the
EPA63 and the ADEA has been uncertain."
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs than performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other fac-
tor other than sex: Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differen-
tial in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employees.
(2) No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees of an employer
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall cause or attempt to
cause such an employer to discriminate against any employee in violation of (1)
of this subsection.
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). Section 4(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633, provides in
relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or attempt to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter
(c) It. shall be unlawful for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
applicant for employment, because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an in-
dividual in violation of this section.
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
61. The pertinent section of Title VII is quoted supra note 39.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
63. See, e.g., Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977) (union not liable
for back pay under EPA); EEOC v. Ferris State College, 493 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(same); Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same). But
see Love v. Temple Univ., 366 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (suggesting that employer could
have right to contribution in action under EPA); Wirtz v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 1 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 9874 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (same).
64. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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This uncertainty could have been resolved by the Supreme Court in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,6 but a
narrowly written opinion left open the possibility of union back-pay
liability in EPA actions by individual employees. Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that an employer does not have a
right to contribution from a union partially at fault for wage differen-
tials in violation of the EPA.66 Northwest Airlines contended
throughout the proceedings that there was an implied cause of action
for contribution under the EPA or, in the alternative, that federal
common law provided for contribution in suits based on
discriminatory wage differentials. In rejecting Northwest's implied
contribution argument, the district court reasoned that because
employers and unions do not share common liability under the EPA,
employers had no implied right of contribution.67 The District of Col-
umbia Circuit agreed with the trial court, reasoning that "[t]he
statutory scheme of enforcement is comprehensive and by omission, it
insulates unions from suits by employers.''68 If it had adopted the
lower court's rationale for rejecting an implied cause of action for
contribution under the EPA, the Supreme Court could have
eliminated any doubt concerning union back-pay liability in private
lawsuits. Focusing instead on congressional intent, however, the Court
concluded that Northwest did not have an implied right to contribu-
tion because employers are in no sense "members of the class for
whose especial benefit ... the Equal Pay Act... was enacted."69 The
Court expressly left open the possibility that an employee could state a
cause of action against a union for involvement in negotiating wage
differentials violating the EPA.7"
65. 451 U.S. 77 (1981). A union may still be subject to back-pay liability in actions by the
government to recover back wages due affected employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 206(b)(c)
(1982).
66. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98. The Court also held that there is no right to con-
tribution under Title VII when there is mutual responsibility for discrimination. Id. For a more
detailed discussion of this aspect of Northwest Airlines see infra notes 236-251 and accompany-
ing text.
67. No. 75-0223 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977) (unpublished).
68. Northwest Airlines v. Transit Workers Union, 606 F.2d 1350, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
69. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 92. For discussion of the principles governing implied
statutory causes of action, see Cort v. Ashe, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also Universities Research
Ass'n Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979).
70. 451 U.S. at 88 n.20. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon the uncertain availability of such a
remedy under the Equal Pay Act as a basis for rejecting petitioner's claim for con-
tribution. The availability of this implied remedy, however, is relevant primarily to
the question whether the elements of a contribution claim have been established; if
no right to contribution exists at all, it is irrelevant that the elements of a tradi-
tional contribution claim may or may not have been established in this case.
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In one of the few decisions discussing union liability under the
ADEA, EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Association,7 the court held that a
union is liable for back pay for its involvement in negotiating a vaca-
tion benefits package that adversely affected pilots over age sixty.
Since the action was brought by the EEOC, however, the court was
not required to determine whether the same relief could be obtained
against the union in a private cause of action."
In contrast, the ADEA was construed narrowly in Marshall v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc." to preclude joinder of a union as a party
defendant and union liability for contribution in government-
prosecuted actions. Eastern argued that Title VII has been interpreted
to require joinder of labor unions that are partially responsible for
discriminatory contract provisions.74 The court simply held that case
law under the FLSA was more pertinent than Title VII authority and
that under the FLSA joinder was unnecessary." Further, the court
Because we conclude that no right to contribution exists under either the statute or
the federal common law, we need not decide whether the elements of a contribu-
tion claim have been established in this case. Therefore, we need not and do not
decide the question whether employees have an implied right of action for backpay
against their unions for violations of the Equal Pay Act. [Citation omitted.]
Although actionability against unions is unclear under the EPA, unions may nevertheless be
held liable for back pay in Title VII actions challenging discriminatory wage differentials. See
supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. Thus, if the Supreme Court ever endorses the theory
of "comparative worth" under Title VII, unions would appear to face a challenging duty in
wage negotiations to protect their minority group members in traditionally lower-paying job
classifications. The Supreme Court preserved the possibility of a comparative worth action by
holding in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) that the "equal work" stan-
dard applied in Equal Pay Act cases was not incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amend-
ment and was not a prerequisite to recovery in Title VII actions alleging unlawful wage differen-
tials. For an excellent and concise discussion of Gunther, see Gould, The Supreme Court's
Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REv.
1, 63-74 (1981).
71. 489 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Minn. 1980), rev'd. on other grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1981).
72. The district court opinion is nevertheless a significant decision under the ADEA. The
union argued that 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982), providing that damages available in ADEA actions
shall include the same remedies available under the FLSA, precludes an award of back pay
against the union. The union based this conclusion on case law interpreting the FLSA as making
the .employer solely responsible for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. The
district court rejected this argument on the ground that limiting back-pay liability to the
employer would not serve the broad remedial purposes of the ADEA. 489 F. Supp. at 1009.
73. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 908 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
74. Citing EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC v.
MacMillan-Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Sears v. Bennett,
645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982); Romero v. Union Pac. R.R.,
615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 97 (1983); Sinyard v. Foote & Davies Div., 577 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1978);
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Williams v.
General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); Kinard v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 458
F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
75. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 909-10.
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denied Eastern's request for contribution from the union on the basis
of analogous case law under the EPA,7 6 citing Brennan v. Emerald
Renovators, Inc.7 In Brennan, the district court denied the employer's
claim for contribution from the union on grounds that it lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over an EPA action for damages against a
labor organization.7s However, the Supreme Court specifically left
open the issue of union back-pay liability under the EPA in Northwest
Air Lines v. Transport Workers Union,7 thereby deflating the ra-
tionale for denying Eastern Air Lines' right to contribution. Conse-
quently, the issue of union liability for back pay in employee actions
under the ADEA and the EPA remains unsettled.
II. Apportionment of Back Pay Between Union and Employer
This part concerns the approaches followed by the courts in
allocating back-pay liability between an employer and a union that
share responsibility for actionable wrongdoing against an employee.0
Throughout the remainder of this article, the term "apportionment"
will refer to the division of responsibility for injury to an employee
between employer and union on the basis of fault." The term "entire
liability" will refer to an employee's right to collect the full amount of
back pay from either defendant, notwithstanding the mutual respon-
sibility for the employee's lost income. The term "separate" liability
will refer to a plaintiff's right to collect from each defendant only the
amount of back pay attributable to that defendant's wrongdoing.
Apportionment of Damages in Actions
Based on Section 301 of the LMRA
Although Bowen v. United States Postal Service12 confirms that a
union may be held liable for back pay for failure to provide fair
76. Id. at 910.
77. 410 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
78. Id. at 1063.
79. 454 U.S. 77 (1981). For a discussion of Northwest Airlines as it applies to the EPA, see
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
80. In contrast to Part I, discussing rules of liability in actions by employees against an
employer or union, Part II assumes mutual union/employer liability and focuses on the degree
of liability.
81. "Apportionment," as used in this article, does not bear on a plaintiff's right to collect
full back pay from either defendant. Rather, the term is used in the more limited sense of at-
tributing fault to mutual wrongdoers. As pointed out by one commentator, the term "apportion-
ment of damages" is also used in personal injury cases to refer to the allocation of separate
liability for separate injuries. Comment, Contribution Between Parties to a Discriminatory Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 173 n.5 (1980), citing W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 52
(4th ed. 1971).
82. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
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representation,83 the scope of this liability under section 301 and the
basis for apportioning back pay requires further examination of the
peculiar nature of "hybrid"" section 301 actions. The starting point is
an analysis of the nature of union wrongdoing actionable under
section 301; that is, what constitutes a breach of the duty of fair
representation." Next, the relationship between union breach of the
duty of fair representation and employer breach of the collective
bargaining agreement in causing loss of income to affected employees
will be examined.
The Duty of Fair Representation
Breach of a union's duty of fair representation arises in two general
contexts-during contract negotiations and during administration of
the contract. Because unfair representation in negotiations cannot
result in section 301 liability,86 this discussion will focus on unfair
representation during contract administration. As with the issue of
union liability for back pay under section 301,87 the seminal Supreme
Court decision concerning the standard of fair representation in con-
tract administration is Vaca v. Sipes."8 The employee in Vaca filed a
grievance with his union contending that he had been wrongfully dis-
charged because of prolonged ill health. Before exhausting all steps in
the contractual grievance procedure, the union concluded that the
employee was physically unfit for continued employment and refused
to press his grievance to arbitration. In the trial of the employee's
83. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
84. Actions by employees against their employer and union pursuant to § 301, are "hybrid"
actions in the sense that the employee is suing the union for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation and the employer for breach of contract. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Service,
103 S. Ct. 588, 602 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); United Parcel Serv.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2. (1981).
85. See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX.
L. REV. 1119 (1973).
86. Section 301 creates a cause of action for breach of a labor contract and, therefore, is in-
applicable to conduct occurring before a contract is signed. See infra note 108. The duty of fair
representation is derived from § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982),
which grants unions supported by a majority of bargaining unit employees the right to
exclusively represent all employees in the bargaining unit. In order to prevent arbitrary union ac-
tion against bargaining unit employees, the duty of fair representation circumscribes union con-
duct both before and after a contract is signed. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 373 U.S. 335
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944) (under Railway Labor Act); Farmer v. ARA Serv., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096 (6th
Cir. 1981). See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51
TEx. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957);
Note, Expanding the Duty of Fair Representation, 49 UMKC L. REV. 105 (1980).
87. See supra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.
88. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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wrongful discharge claim, the jury returned a verdict against the union
on a finding that the employee was medically qualified to continue
working. 9 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.9 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Missouri Supreme Court
erred in sustaining a jury instruction premising union liability under
section 301 on the merits of the underlying grievance.9' The Supreme
Court explained that a union's breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion for refusing to fully process a grievance must rest upon a finding
that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith
toward the grievant.
92
This standard was extended to unfair representation cases in Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,91 which involved a claim against a
union after all steps of the grievance machinery had been exhausted.
As explained by the Court:
The union's breach of duty released the employee of an express or
implied requirement that disputes be settled through a contractual
grievance procedure; if it seriously undermines the integrity of the
arbitral process the union's breach also removes the bar of the
finality provisions of the contract .... As is the case where there
has been a failure to exhaust, however, we cannot believe that
89. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965).
90. Id.
91. The essential issue submitted to the jury was whether the union ... arbitrarily...
refused to carry said grievance . . . through the fifth step ....
"We have concluded that there was sufficient substantial evidence from which the
jury reasonably could have found the foregoing issue in favor of plaintiff. It is
notable that no physician actually testified in the case. Both sides were content to
rely upon written statements. Three physicians certified that the plaintiff was able
to perform his regular work. Three other physicians certified that they had taken
plaintiff's blood pressure and that the readings were approximately 160 over 100.
It may be inferred that such a reading does not indicate that his blood pressure was
dangerously high. Moreover, plaintiff's evidence showed that he had actually done
hard physical labor periodically during the four years following his discharge. We
accordingly ruled this point adversely to defendants."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 189 (1967), quoting Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Mo. 1965).
92. As explained by the Court:
Some have suggested that every individual employee should have the right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration. Others have urged that the union be given
substantial discretion (if the collective bargaining agreement so provides) to decide
whether a grievance should be taken to arbitration, subject only to the duty to
refrain from patently wrongful conduct such as racial discrimination or personal
hostility.
Though we accept a proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion, we do not agree that
the individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to
arbitration . . ..
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190-91.
93. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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Congress intended to foreclose the employee from his § 301
remedy otherwise available against the employer if the contractual
process has been seriously flawed by the union's breach of its duty
to represent employees honestly and in good faith and without in-
vidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct.
9
4
The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed the Vaca standard of
scrutiny for unfair representation in contract administration in Del
Costello v. Teamsters."
Application of the Vaca standard has been a frequent task for the
lower courts.6 When all steps of the grievance process have been
followed, as in Hines, lower court decisions are decidedly pro-union.
9 7
In Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 9s for example, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected an employee's claim that union representation before
an arbitral panel was perfunctory, stating that:
Nothing less than a demonstration that the union acted with
reckless disregard for the employee's rights or was grossly defi-
cient in its conduct will suffice to establish such a claim.... [W]e
believe that a claim that a union acted "perfunctorily" requires a
demonstration that the union ignored the grievance, inexplicably
failed to take some required step, or gave the grievance merely
cursory attention. [Citations omitted.]99
94. Id. at 567, 570. Plaintiffs in Hines were truck drivers who had been discharged for
allegedly falsifying expenie reports for lodging. The union processed plaintiffs' grievances
through all steps of the arbitration procedure, but the joint arbitration committee ruled in favor
of the company. Plaintiff contended that the union breached its duty of fair representation by
failing to conduct an investigation that according to plaintiffs, would readily have produced
evidence that the alleged falsification was actually due to a mistake by a motel clerk in recording
receipts. The appellate court held that union negligence in failing to investigate the circumstances
underlying a grievance could rise to the level of unfair representation. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
95. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983). See also IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979).
96. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983); Harris v.
Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1982); Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d
519 (7th Cir. 1981); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. In-
terstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator
Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980). See generally Morgan, Fair is Foul, and Foul is
Fair-Ruzicka and the Duty of Fair Representation i  the Circuit Courts. 11 TOL. L. REv. 335
(1980).
97. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 96.
98. 668 F.2d 1204 (l1th Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 1206-07, citing Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir.
1980); Robesky v. Qantus Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Dober
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1983); Hart v. National Homes Corp., 668
F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1982); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1981); Franklin
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979). Cf. Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co.,
616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980).
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Similarly, the lower courts have given unions wide discretion to in-
stitute or discontinue grievance processing.00 As explained by the
Fourth Circuit in Buchanan v. NLRB1 1: "[Tihe duty to avoid ar-
bitrary conduct does not require a union to take every employee
grievance to arbitration, and it has considerable discretion in sifting
out grievances which it regards as lacking merit. Without such discre-
tion, a union's effectiveness as bargaining agent would be undermined.
[Citations omitted.]"102 In addition, lower courts have held that a
union may properly decide not to process a grievance that might
unduly strain limited union resources"' or because processing the
grievance would not be in the best interest of the bargaining unit.04
100. When a union's failure to process a grievance is due to inadvertent neglect, as opposed to
a reasoned decision, courts have not applied Vaca standards with uniformity. Compare Hoff-
man v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981) (negligent failure to timely file appeal under
union constitution is not breach of duty of fair representation); Coe v. URW, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th
Cir. 1978) (union unfair representation must be based on deliberate conduct); Augspurger v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975) (negligence not enough for
finding of unfair representation) with Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir.
1981) (unexplained failure to timely pursue necessary step in grievance procedure to timely pur-
sue necessary step in grievance procedure is breach of duty of fair representation); Robesky
v. Qantus Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978) (gross negligence may breach duty
of fair representation); Byrne v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 536 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
(union neglect in failing to advise grievant of necessity of filing written grievance with union was
breach of duty of fair representation).
101. 597 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979).
102. Id. at 394, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1976); Hardee v. North Carolina
Allstate Serv., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255, 1259 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.,
609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 614 F.2d 294, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); Ness
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1979); Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590
F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1979); Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 575 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1978); Lewis v.
Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Whitten v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975). But cf. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982) (union refusal to process grievance due to grievant's hiring of attorney
was breach of duty of fair representation); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291
(1st Cir. 1978) (unexplained failure to file grievance is breach of duty of fair representation);
Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (union may not refuse to process grievance
"merely at whim" of someone exercising union authority); de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Traba-
jadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1971) (union
violated duty of fair representation by refusing to process grievance due to mistaken belief that
claims would be resolved in unfair labor practice case). One commentator has argued that a
union's decision not to process a grievance should be analyzed pursuant to a "good reason" test.
Clark, supra note 85, at 1161-67.
103. See Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Freeman v.
O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Hershman v. Sierra Pac. Power Co.,
434 F. Supp 46 (D. Nev. 1977) (dictum).
104. See, e.g., Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (union refusal
to process repeated grievance not arbitrary); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 433 F. Supp
314 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (employee disciplinary record proper consideration); Pesola v. Inland Tool
& Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (employee absentee record proper union con-
sideration).
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Finally, in contract interpretation of grievances involving competing
interests among bargaining unit employees, the courts again emphasize
the need to give unions broad discretion,'10 with the added caution
that the union must make a reasoned assessment of the competing
employee interests and cannot be motivated by improper considera-
tions. 06
Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation as a
Necessary Element in § 301 Actions by Individual Employees
Cases applying the duty of fair representation under section 301
uniformly hold that an award of back pay must be based on decisive
wrongdoing by the union. 7 Union liability for unfair representation
in section 301 actions is also contingent on a breach of contract by the
employer.' Thus the role of union misconduct in causing section 301
back-pay liability to accrue is twofold: (1) by failing to fulfill its duty
of fair representation, the union removes a bar to a suit under section
301 against both employer and union;" 9 and (2) by failing to provide
an employee with fair representation, the union reduces the possibility
of remedying an alleged breach of contract before an employee is
significantly injured.
Breach of the duty of fair representation as the threshold require-
ment for maintenance of a section 301 action by individual employees
was first announced by the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes."I Prior to
Vaca, the Supreme Court provided employees with a remedy against
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. _
106. See, e.g., King v. Space Carriers, Inc., 608 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1979); Ekas v. Carling
Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Burch-
field v. United Steelworkers, 577 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1978); Thacker v. Palm Beach Co., 450 F.
Supp. 761 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). Cf. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.
1980) (union breached duty of fair representation by failure to consider interest of employees
with low seniority); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employees
stated claim based on unfair representation resulting from union's failure to consider plaintiff's
related interest while processing grievance of another employee). See generally Summers, The In-
dividual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Considera-
tion? 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977).
107. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
108. See Sear v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1981); Chuy v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Pajares v. United Steelworkers Local 5769, 432 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1977). Cf. Foust v.
IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
109. See infra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
110. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976);
Florey v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 575 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1978); Rabalais v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 566 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978); Shepherd v. Chrysler Corp., 433 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Hardwick v. United States Postal Serv., 391 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
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their union for a breach of duty of fair representation"' and condi-
tioned an employee's right to sue under section 301 on exhaustion of
contractual remedies.' 2 The Supreme Court connected the concepts of
fair representation and exhaustion of remedies in Vaca, holding that
an employee who has not exhausted contractual remedies may seek
relief under section 301 when "the union has sole power under the
contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if,
as is alleged here, the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from ex-
hausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to
process the grievance."'13 In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. , 14
the Court further held that unfair representation by the union will
remove the bar of finality " ' if the union's breach "seriously under-
mines the integrity of the arbitral process .... ,16 One district court
has summarized Vaca and Hines as follows: "The essence of Vaca and
Hines is that the union's misconduct, its breach of DFR, must effec-
tively deprive the employee of his contractual remedy in order to
remove the bar of either the exhaustion requirement or the finality
clause to the employee's independent suit under § 301."' Thus, any
award of back pay to an employee under section 301 is necessarily
traceable to the employer's breach of contract giving rise to the initial
grievance and to the union's breach of duty enabling the employee to
sue in federal court.
Lower Court Decisions Apportioning § 301 Back-Pay Liability
Although back-pay liability for breach of employee contractual
rights is contingent on a finding of unfair representation by the union,
lower courts confronted with the issue of apportioning back-pay
liability in section 301 actions have either discussed causation solely in
relation to the merits of the grievance"' or have rejected causation
analysis by summarily concluding that union deprivation of employee
111. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See supra note 86.
112. Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
113. 386 U.S. at 185 (emphasis in original).
114. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
115. Collective bargaining agreements customarily provide that exhaustion of the contractual
grievance procedure will act as a bar to any subsequent litigation concerning the alleged breach
of contract. Finality clauses in collective bargaining agreements are uniformly enforced by the
federal courts. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 103 S.Ct 2177 (1983); Rehmar v. Smith, 555
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976); Otero v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers,
474 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1973); Haynes v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966).
116. Hines, 424 U.S. at 567.
117. Sear v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1350, 1358 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 654 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1981).
118. See Self v. Teamsters Local 61, 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980).
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contractual remedies is not an adequate basis for an award of back
pay.'1 9 The former approach, illustrated by Self v. Teamsters Local
61, 20 imposes back-pay liability on unions only if satisfaction of the
duty of fair representation would have resulted in an award favorable
to the grievant.
The plaintiffs in Self were a group of truck drivers dischargedt from
Carolina Freight Lines for engaging in an unauthorized work stop-
page. In a section 301 action, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been
improperly discharged under the labor contract2 ' and that the union
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to press their claims
against the employer.'22 The plaintiffs also alleged that the union
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to keep the union
membership apprised of the status of negotiations for a new national
collective bargaining agreement.'23 The unauthorized work stoppage
resulted from plaintiffs' mistaken belief that contract negotiations had
broken down.'24
After determining that the union improperly failed to inform
members about the status of contract negotiations, the district court
held that the union had "participated" in the discharge by improperly
failing to keep employees abreast of contract negotiations and that the
union breached its duty of fair representation in processing plaintiffs'
grievances. The court awarded $600,000 for back pay and other
monetary relief against the union."' Although the Fourth Circuit ac-
cepted the district court's findings of wrongdoing by the union,2 6 it
reversed the district court's assessment of back pay against the union.
After determining that the union's failure to properly inform the
employees about the status of ongoing collective bargaining did not
constitute participation in the discharge of plaintiffs,' 27 the court held
that the union's unfair representation in processing grievances was not
a sufficient basis for back-pay liability: "[D]espite the District Court's
119. See Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982); Milstead v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981); Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79
(4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983).
120. 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980).
121. The district court dismissed the action against Carolina Freight after the joint grievance
committee determined that the unauthorized work stoppage provided grounds for discharge. Id.
at 441.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 442. Carolina Freight Lines and Local 61 were signatories to the National Master
Freight Agreement and the North Carolina Supplement, which were being negotiated for a three-
year renewal before the plaintiffs began their work stoppage.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 441.
126. Id. at 443.
127. Id.
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findings of inadequacy in the union's representation in the initial
grievance proceedings, there was no showing that the plaintiffs'
dismissals would not have stood even had the union done its duty and
pressed the case more zealously." 28 In other words, according to the
Fourth Circuit, a union is not subject to back-pay liability in section
301 actions unless the court determines that satisfaction of the duty of
fair representation would have resulted in a grievance resolution
favorable to the plaintiff.1
29
The approach taken by both the district court and the circuit court
in Self is troublesome for a number of reasons. First, section 301 is
essentially a breach of contract action and neither the union nor the
employer should be liable for back pay when the employer did not
breach the labor contract130 Whether the grievance would have been
resolved differently had the union performed its duty of fair represen-
tation is irrelevant when the district court has independently deter-
mined that there has been no breach of contract. Second, conditioning
union liability on a finding that the arbitrator would have ruled favor-
ably for the plaintiff, had he been fairly represented by the union, in-
jects an extremely intangible and subjective element of proof into sec-
tion 301 actions. Third, with regard to apportionment of back-pay
liability between employer and union, the approach to causation dis-
cussed in Self ignores the fact that the union's breach of duty removed
the exhaustion and finality bars to the employee's section 301 action
and thereby subjected the employer to back-pay liability.' Finally,
the Self approach subjects employers to exclusive liability for back pay
despite their lack of control over union representation.
One advantage of the Self approach to apportioning back-pay
liability in section 301 actions is that it recognizes that unions may
properly be held liable for back pay in actions based on breach of con-
tract. By contrast, several lower courts have stubbornly concluded that
the loss of back pay is not caused by union unfair representation and
may not properly be awarded against labor organizations in actions
arising out of the employment relationship. 3 2 Seymour v. Olin
Corp.' is particularly representative of this line of cases.
128. Id. at 443-44.
129. Although the district court concluded that plaintiffs might well have not been discharged
if the union fairly represented them in processing a grievance, the appellate court suggested that
a more affirmative finding on this point would be necessary in order to impose back-pay liability
on the union. Id. at 443 n.11.
130. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
132. See Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1982); Seymour v. Olin
Corp., 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1982); Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d
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Seymour, an electrician employed by Olin Corporation, was
discharged in 1977 for selling electrical wire that he had allegedly
misappropriated from his employer.'34 Shortly after learning of his
discharge, Seymour contacted the president of the local union and was
informed that the union would conduct an investigation. The union
conducted an investigation, but refused to process Seymour's
grievance unless Seymour "got rid" of an attorney he had retained to
protect his interest in continued employment and to defend against
possible criminal charges.'35 On appeal from a judgment that the
union breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to process
Seymour's grievance, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's in-
struction on breach of duty of fair representation and held that there
was a rational basis for the jury's determination that the union's con-
duct was arbitrary.'36
The Fifth Circuit further held that the district court properly in-
structed the jury "to assess all of the damages for loss of income in-
curred by Seymour against Olin if it found for Seymour on the fair
representation and wrongful discharge claims."' 3 7 In response to
Olin's arguments that liability for back pay should be apportioned
between union and employer, the appellate court held that under Vaca
back pay is not attributable to breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion and will not be assessed against a union. Obviously impatient with
the employer's request for apportionment of back pay, the court
characterized Olin's argument as follows: "Olin, the wrongdoer, pro-
tests to the union: you should be liable for all damages flowing from
my wrong from and after a certain time, because you should have
caught and rectified my wrong by that time."'38 The Fifth Circuit's
lack of sympathy for the employer's argument that the union was par-
tially responsible for the employee's loss of income is typical of other
recent circuit court decisions in section 301 actions.
In Milstead v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,'39 the Sixth
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, upheld a district court ruling denying
79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983). See generally Comment, Apportionment of
Damages in DFR/Contract Suits: Who Pays for the Union's Breach?, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 155.
133. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
134. Id. at 205.
135. Id. at 206. Seymour testified, and the jury determined, that the local union president told
plaintiff that it could not process plaintiff's grievance until he discharged his lawyer because it
was against union policy to allow a lawyer to sit in on union business. The jury found that the
union refused to process plaintiff's grievance whether or not his attorney would be present at the
grievance hearing. Id.
136. Id. at 210.
137. Id. at 212.
138. Id. at 215.
139. 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981).
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the plaintiff an opportunity to submit evidence of lost wages during
the damages phase of a hybrid section 301 action in which the union
was the sole defendant.'40 Relying on Vaca, the Sixth Circuit explained
that evidence of lost wages could not properly be considered by the
jury because back pay was not a proper component of union
liability.' 4' Accordingly, plaintiff Milstead was limited to introducing
evidence of court costs, attorney's fees, travel expenses, "and other
costs incidental to his attempts to recover against the union." 
42
Milstead is particularly interesting because an earlier Sixth Circuit
decision, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,"43 has traditionally been
cited as authority for apportioning section 301 back-pay liability. 44 As
in Milstead, the plaintiff in Ruzicka contended that he had been im-
properly discharged under the labor contract and that he was denied
reinstatement as a result of the union's failure to represent him fairly
through the grievance procedure. The district court dismissed the ac-
tion on the ground that Ruzicka, as a matter of law, had failed to
establish unfair representation.4 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded,'4 instructing the district court to submit the discharge
issue to an independent arbitrator,'47 and further instructing that
union liability, if any, would be limited to "that portion of
140. Id. at 396. During the trial on the merits, both union and employer were parties defend-
ant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and assessed $20,000 damages against the
union and $10,000 against the employer. After trial, the employer settled with plaintiff, but the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters appealed the amount of damages. The appellate court
upheld the finding of liability, but remanded for a new trial on size of the damages award
against the union. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978).
141. 649 F.2d at 396.
142. Id. See also Soto Segarra v. Seal & Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1978); Milstead v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978); Scott v. Local Union 377, 548
F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1977); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d
281 (3d Cir. 1971).
143. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
144. See generally Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability For Damages Between Employer
and Union in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30
MERCER L. REV. 651, 675-78 (1979); Martucci, Employer Liability For Union Unfair Represen-
tation: The Judicial Predilection and Underlying Policy Considerations, 46 Mo. L. REv. 78,
104-09 (1981); Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits: Who Pays For
The Union's Breach?, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 155.
145. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030, 2031 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
Ruzicka based the claim of unfair representation on the union's negligent failure to file notice of
appeal to the third step of the grievance procedure on time. The district court refused to
characterize the union's negligence as unfair representation, but the appellate court concluded
that the union's overall processing of plaintiff's grievance could have been perfunctory, and
therefore reversed the district court on this issue. Ruzicka, 523 F.2d at 310.
146. 523 F.2d at 315.
147. Id.
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Appellant's injury representing 'increases, if any, in those damages
[chargeable to the employer] caused by the union's refusal to process
the grievance.' "I" On remand, the district court adopted an ar-
bitrator's finding that Ruzicka had been improperly discharged and,
after receiving additional evidence, held that the union's representa-
tion of Ruzicka was perfunctory. '49
Turning to the issue of damages, the district court elaborated on the
instructions from the Sixth Circuit,'10 explaining that "a proper appor-
tionment of damages must consider not only the chronology of the de-
fendants' wrongful acts but also the gravity and nature of [the] wrong-
doing. Each defendant contributed in its own way to the injuries suffered
by [the] plaintiff, and each must answer for damages accordingly." 5'
Although the court's formulation appears to require evaluation of
several factors in determining the proper allocation of liability, the
court concluded with little analysis that each defendant was liable for
one-half of the total back-pay award.'
Since Sixth Circuit rejection of union liability for back pay in
Milstead, the most favorable authority for the apportionment of back-
pay liability is IBEW v. Foust.'55 In Foust, a radioman discharged by
the Union Pacific Railroad Company brought suit against his union
under the Railway Labor Act 54 contending that he was denied fair
representation. As in Milstead,'5" the plaintiff settled with the
employer and sought relief in federal court solely against the union.56
In contrast to Milstead, however, the court instructed the jury that a
finding of unfair representation could subject the union to liability for
plaintiff's loss of "salary and wages, overtime pay, vacation pay, in-
surance, seniority and fringe benefits which the plaintiff would have
received during the period he would have been working for the
railroad company." '57 The district court also instructed the jury that a
148. Id. at 312, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967).
149. Ruzicka, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2822, 2830 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151. Ruzicka, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2837.
152. Id.
153. 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
154. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982). Unions representing employees of companies subject to the
Railway Labor Act are held to the same standards of representation established by the Labor
Management Relations Act. In fact, the duty of fair representation was established in a series of
cases arising under the Railway Labor Act. See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
155. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981). See supra
notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
156. 572 F.2d at 718.
157. Id.
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finding of wrongful discharge was unnecessary to an award of back
pay against the union."' The jury found the union breached its duty
of fair representation and assessed amages, primarily in the form of
back pay, against the union in the amount of $40,000. The district
court entered judgment in this amount and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.5 9
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Foust is commendable for its
recognition that back-pay liability may properly be imposed on a labor
organization for unfair representation during the processing of a
grievance. However, the assessment of back-pay liability to a union
without a finding that the employee was wrongfully discharged goes
too far in removing causation as an element of back-pay liability. At
the other extreme, the courts excluding unions from back-pay
liability, 160 or suggesting as in Self that union back-pay liability is con-
ditioned on a finding that unfair representation caused an erroneous
arbitration decision,'6' ignore the role of unfair representation in in-
dividual section 301 actions as an inseparable cause of the employee's
injury and the award of back pay against the employer. 'Failure to
analyze the role of the duty of fair representation in the overall context
of contract administration has been a common error in circuit court
decisions considering apportionment of back-pay liability under sec-
tion 301.
Bowen v. United States Postal Service
Earlier in this article,'62 Bowen v. United States Postal Service'63
was discussed in connection with its holding that an employee may
properly be awarded back pay against a union in hybrid section 301
actions. Bowen is also significant for its clarification of the role of
causation in apportioning section 301 liability between employer and
union. As in many lower court cases discussing apportionment of sec-
tion 301 back-pay liability, the plaintiff, Charles V. Bowen, alleged
that his discharge from employment violated the collective bargaining
158. Id.
159. Punitive damages totalling $75,000 were also assessed against the union in Foust. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the union on the sole issue of the availability of punitive
damages against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Reasoning that federal
labor policies would be ill-served by subjecting unions to punitive damages for unfair representa-
tion, the Court held that punitive damages could not be assessed against a union under § 301.
IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979).
160. See supra notes 133-152 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
163. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
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agreement'6 and that the union failed to fairly represent him by fail-
ing to take his grievance to arbitration without sufficient reason.'65
In response to a set of questions submitted as a special verdict, the
jury found'6  that Bowen was discharged without just cause and that
the union handled Bowen's grievance in an arbitrary and perfunctory
manner. The district court credited the jury's findings and entered
judgment against both defendants.'67 The district court also approved
the verdict finding the Postal Service liable for $17,000 back pay and
the union liable for $30,000 back pay.'68 This apportionment of back-
pay liability was based on an instruction that back-pay liability should
be apportioned to the employer prior to the date on which arbitration
would have been conducted and to the union thereafter, until the date
of Bowen's reinstatement.'69
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
in most respects,'7 but ruled that the district court improperly assessed
back-pay liability to the union: "As Bowen's compensation was at all
times payable only by the Service, reimbursement of his lost earnings
continued to be the obligation of the Service exclusively. Hence, no
portion of the deprivations-$47,000.00 plus $5,954.12 was chargeable
to the Union."' 7 Despite its refusal to impose back-pay liability on
the union, the appellate court apparently accepted the district court's
164. The Postal Service discharged Bowen effective April 20, 1976, citing an alleged assault by
plaintiff on a fellow employee and his alleged failure to attend and pass two separate qualifica-
tion tests required for distribution clerk. Brief for the Respondent Union, On Writ Of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 81-525, at 3, Bowen v. United
States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981).
165. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). The union processed Bowen's grievance through three of the four
steps involved in the grievance procedure under the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
The national union cited the following reasons for not appealing Bowen's discharge to arbitra-
tion: (1) the union had been unsuccessful in winning reversal of discipline through arbitration of
assault cases; (2) the Postal Inspector's investigative memorandum was thorough and credible;
and (3) the information in the file supported the view that Bowen had an apparent propensity
for violence directed at fellow employees. Brief for Respondent Union, supra note 164, at 7.
166. The jury sat in an advisory capacity only on the claims against the United States Postal
Service. See supra note 27.
167. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D. Va. 1979).
168. Id. at 1131.
169. Id. Question 3 of the Special Verdict stated: "If [you find that the Union breached its
duty of fair representation and/or the Service discharged Bowen without just cause], state from
a preponderance of the evidence or with reasonable certainty the amount of compensatory
damages to which [Bowen] is entitled."
Question 8 stated: "If compensatory damages are awarded by your answer to Question 3,
state the amount, if any, that should be attributable to the defendant Union and the amount, if
any, that should be attributable to the defendant Postal Service." 103 S. Ct. at 591 n.2.
170. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 588
(1983).
171. 642 F.2d at 82, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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apportionment of fault for Bowen's loss of income. After denying
both defendants' petitions for rehearing, the court sua sponte
explained that it would not modify the judgment against the Postal
Service to include the full amount of the district court's back-pay
award.1
72
Plaintiff sought rehearing and rehearing en banc contending that the
circuit court should have assessed entire liability to the Postal Service
or, alternatively, that the original apportionment of damages by the
district court should be reinstated.7 3 After rehearing was denied by
the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for
certiorari concerning the apportionment of back-pay liability between
employer and union and the circuit court's refusal to assess entire
liability to the employer."' The second issue was never reached
because the Court held that the district court properly apportioned
back-pay liability between employer and union on the basis of relative
fault in causing Bowen's loss of income."'
Writing for the majority of five,'76 Justice Powell found that the
union's role in enforcing a collective bargaining agreement provided a
sufficient basis for assessing back-pay liability:
The difficulty with this argument [that a union is not subject to
back-pay liability] is that it treats the relationship between the
employer and the employee, created by the collective-bargaining
agreement, as if it were a simple contract of hire governed by
traditional common law principles. This reading of Vaca fails to
recognize that a collective-bargaining agreement is much more
than traditional common law employment terminable at will.
Rather, it is an agreement creating relationships and interests
under the federal common law of labor policy.'"
This comment, in contrast to the majority of lower court decisions,7 8
recognizes that in a unionized plant, discipline and discharge decisions
by an employer "cannot be viewed independently of the [grievance]
system that interprets [the labor contract]."179 The Bowen Court fur-
ther recognized that sheltering unions from back-pay liability under
172. 642 F.2d at 82, n.6.
173. Brief of the Federal Respondent, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 81-525, at 8, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d
79 (4th Cir. 1981).
174. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1981).
175. Id. at 599.
176. See supra note 32.
177. 103 S. Ct. at 594.
178. See supra notes 132-152 and accompanying text.
179. See Comment, Apportionment of Damages and DFR/Contracts Suits; Who pays for the
Union's Breach?, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 115.
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section 301 was inconsistent with long-established federal labor policy.
First, the Court reasoned that exclusion of unions from back-pay
liability would frustrate the policy of encouraging private resolution of
labor disputes' by removing a union incentive to pursue the grievance
procedure."' Second, because unfair representation is an element of
proof in individual section 301 actions, it would be unfair to saddle the
employer with entire liability:
Were it not for the union's failure to represent he employee fair-
ly, the employer's breach "could [have been] remedied through
the grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's benefit." The
fault that justifies dropping the bar to the employee's suit for
damages also requires the union to bear some responsibility for in-
creases in the employee's damages resulting from its breach. To
hold otherwise would make the employer alone liable for the con-
sequences of the union's breach of duty.1 82
Finally, the Powell majority stated that imposing entire liability on
employers would frustrate federal labor policy by discouraging em-
ployers from negotiating grievance procedures into collective bargain-
ing agreements.8 '
By analyzing union back-pay liability under section 301 in terms of
the union's role in enforcing the labor contract and the employer's
reliance on the union's fulfillment of representation obligations
toward employees, the Supreme Court appears to embrace the district
court's chronological apportionment of back-pay liability with the
hypothetical arbitration dates serving as a fulcrum separating
employer liability and union liability.8 4 Unfortunately, the Court
disclaimed approval or disapproval of the district court's apportion-
ment formula on the ground that the union objected to the district
court decision solely on the theory that unions are altogether exempt
from back-pay liability under section 301.185 Moreover, the Court
180. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 596, citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
181. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597.
182. Id. at 595, quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). The Court further stated:
The union's breach of its duty of fair representation, however, caused the
grievance procedure to malfunction resulting in an increase in the employee's
damages. Even though both the employer and the union have caused the damages
suffered by the employee, the union is responsible for the increases in damages
and, as between the two wrongdoers, should bear its portion of the damages.
Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
185. 103 S. Ct. at 599 n.19. The Bowen minority believed that the majority held the district
court's apportionment formula to be valid:
The Court holds that an employer who wrongfully discharges an employee pro-
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pointed out that, although back-pay liability under section 301 may be
apportioned according to fault, the employee will be entitled to collect
the full back-pay award from the employer. 8 6 The plaintiff's right to
hold the employer entirely liable for back pay reinforces the compen-
satory purpose of section 301, 187 but it may require an employer to pay
a disproportionate share of a back-pay award.'88 In Part III, the
potential inequities inherent in the assessment of entire liability when
there is mutual fault for wrongdoing against an employee is discussed
in connection with the availability of contribution under section 301.
Apportionment of Back-Pay Liability Under Title VII and § 1981
As seen above, section 301 case law is characterized by difficulty in
determining the role of causation in apportioning damages between
employer and union in individual actions to enforce contractual rights.
The role of causation as a basis for apportioning damages between
employer and union in employee actions to enforce rights created by
federal antidiscrimination laws is even more troublesome. Whereas
section 301 liability can arise only from breach of the duty of fair
representation by the union during administration and enforcement of
the labor contract,8 9 union and employer liability for violation of the
antidiscrimination laws can arise both before and after a collective
bargaining agreement is signed.90 Moreover, union liability under Ti-
tle VII and section 1981 is not tied into a specific procedural mecha-
nism as in section 301; rather, union involvement in unlawful discrimi-
nation may arise in many contexts, including unfair representation in
processing a grievance.19'
tected by a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause is only
responsible for backpay that accrues prior to the hypothetical date upon which an
arbitrator would have issued an award had the employee's union taken the matter
to arbitration. All backpay damages that accrue after this time are the sole respon-
sibility of the union, even where, as here, the union is in no way responsible for the
employer's decision to terminate the employee.
Id. at 599 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 595 n.12. Footnote 12 in Bowen notes several questions that the Court did not
address. First, could an employee collect 100% back pay from the union when liability has been
apportioned between union and employer? Second, will an employee be required to prove in-
ability to collect from a union before proceeding to collect full back pay from the employer?
Third, will an employer have a right to contribution from the union after paying the entire back-
pay award? The availability of contribution under § 301 is discussed infra in note 235.
187. "Of paramount importance is the right of the employee, who has been injured by both
employer's and the union's breach, to be made whole." Id.
188. See infra note 239 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the availability of
contribution under § 301.
189. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
190. As has been previously discussed, unions are clearly subject to back-pay liability for
violation of Title VII or § 1981. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
191. For a summary of union activity commonly giving rise to liability for unlawful discrimi-
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Discrimination During Negotiation of Labor Contract
Regardless of the degree of union responsibility for a discriminatory
contract provision,'92 the courts have shown great reluctance to apply
any mechanistic formula to apportionment of back-pay liability under
Title VII. If a union is strictly liable for negotiating a discriminatory
contract provision, and both parties possess equal bargaining power, it
could be appropriate simply to assign 50% liability each to employer
and union. Mere acquiescence to a discriminatory contract provision is
probably not a sufficient basis for union liability under Title VII, 193
however, and the uniform assessment of equal liability ignores the ac-
tual responsibility of a union or employer for inclusion of the unlawful
provision. Therefore, if causation is considered relevant to the proper
apportionment of back-pay liability in actions under Title VII, as the
Bowen Court held it to be under section 301, courts must closely ex-
amine the bargaining process and relationship culminating in inclusion
of a discriminatory provision in the labor contract.'9
Despite recognition that signatories to a collective bargaining agree-
ment often share different degrees of culpability for discriminatory
nation, see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. The standards of union liability for
unlawful discrimination are succinctly stated in Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimina-
tion, 93 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1980).
192. As explained by one commentator:
A court confronted with a discriminatory provision in a collective bargaining
agreement could analyze union liability under Title VII in two ways. The court
could confine its inquiry to results of the collective bargaining process and hold the
union liable per se for signing a contract that violates Title VII. Alternatively, the
court could attempt to analyze the pre-contract negotiations between union and the
company to determine whether one party lacked responsibility for inclusion of the
offending clause. A union would be excused from liability if it could show that it
made sufficient efforts to exclude the unlawful provision from the contract.
Note, Union Liability For Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702, 703-04 (1980)
(emphasis in original), citing Comment, The Union as Title VII Plaintiff. Affirmative Obligation
To Litigate?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1388, 1405-13 (1978).
193. See, e.g., Terrel v. United States Pipe & Foundry, 644 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1981) (union
not liable for discriminatory seniority system when it had actively taken steps to minimize
discriminatory effect of provision); EEOC v. Detroit-Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975)
(union liable under Title VII for role in negotiating unlawful seniority system but not liable as
party to labor contract for discriminatory hiring or testing practices), vacated and remanded, 431
U.S. 951 (1977) (remanded for further consideration in light of Supreme Court's decision in
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States); Sears v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 454 F.
Supp. 158 (D. Kan. 1978) (district court must analyze union role in negotiating discriminatory
seniority system before assessing Title VII liability). But cf. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 U.S. 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (language indicating that signatories to discriminatory labor
contract are per se liable); Myers v. Gilman Paper Co., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modified on
reh., 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (same); Cox v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974), modified on other grounds, 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied sub nom. Allied Chem. Corp. v. White, 434 U.S. 1051 (1977) (same).
194. Note that the standard for union liability is "cause or attempt to cause" discrimination
by the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1982). See supra note 46.
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contract provisions,"' lower courts have been uniformly reluctant to
apportion Title VII liability between employer and union on the basis
of fault. Typically, after determining that a particular contract provi-
sion is discriminatory, the courts have held that the parties are equally
liable for the employee's resulting loss of income.'96 A recent Eleventh
Circuit decision, Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 91 ex-
emplifies the unwillingness to allocate Title VII liability on the basis of
fault. The plaintiffs in Seaboard contended that as a result of an
unlawful collective bargaining agreement provision, they had been
locked into a low-paying job classification that was disproportionately
filled by black employees.' After determining that the railroad had
historically discriminated in hiring by segregating black applicants in
lower-paying job categories and that the collective bargaining agree-
ment perpetuated the discriminatory hiring practice by limiting promo-
tional opportunities of employees in the lower-paying job classifica-
tions, 99 the district court entered judgment against the union.200 On
appeal, the union argued that it should not be fully responsible for
back pay because (1) the railroad company was responsible for hiring
and promotion of employees, and (2) the labor contract was originally
negotiated on a nationwide basis and did not have a discriminatory ef-
fect in the majority of bargaining units.2"' The appellate court agreed
195. Compare Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (inclusion of
union shop clause in labor contract discriminated toward employees with religious-based objec-
tion to payment of union dues) and Sears v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1981) (union pressure on employer to accept discriminatory contract provision) with Bennett v.
Central Tel. Co., 545 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. 111. 1982) (employer primarily responsible for inclusion
of discriminatory job bidding procedure in labor contract).
196. There is a handful of cases indicating that the party primarily responsible for inclusion of
a discriminatory contract provision is exclusively liable for back pay. However, only one of the
signatory parties was found to have violated Title VII in these cases. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enter-
prise Ass'n, Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976) (union exclusively liable); Ben-
nett v. Central Tel. Co., 545 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Il1. 1982) (employer exclusively liable).
197. 678 F.2d 992 (lth Cir. 1982).
198. The bargaining unit involved in Seaboard was composed of employees in four job
categories: carmen, carmen apprentices, helper apprentices, and carmen helpers. Carmen were
the highest-paid employees in the bargaining unit and the positions of carmen apprentice and
helper apprentice enabled employees to automatically progress to the carmen position. By con-
trast, the carmen helper's position, which was composed entirely of black employees, did not
provide for automatic progression and effectively restricted black employees to lower-paying
positions. Id. at 997-98.
199. Jackson v. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, No. 576-54, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Ga. May 15,
1980).
200. The employer was originally joined as a party defendant, but plaintiffs dropped their
charges of discrimination against the railroad company in an amended complaint. Subsequently,
the court ordered the employer reinstated as party defendant for the limited purpose of pro-
viding employees full relief in the form of reinstatement with full seniority. 678 F.2d at 999.
201. Id. at 1016-17. Additionally, the union contended on appeal that plaintiffs did not prove
that they were qualified for promotions. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because
there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that plaintiffs were qualified.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/2
ALLOCATION OF BA CK-PA Y LIABILITY
with the union's contention that the employer was primarily responsi-
ble for the discriminatory practices, but it nevertheless held that the
union was liable for full back pay:
[T]he promotion system attacked by appellees is contained in the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated in 1967, and, there-
fore, the Brotherhood as well as the Railroad can be held liable
for its discriminatory impact. "A union is jointly liable with the
employer for discrimination caused in whole or in part by the pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement. As the representative
of the black employees, the union is charged with the duty of pro-
tecting them from invidious treatment."202
Since the employer in Seaboard was solely responsible for the initial
hiring discrimination resulting in the contractual promotion system's
discriminatory impact, assessment of entire back-pay liability to the
union is excessive. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the court
considered, or the union requested, apportionment of liability on the
basis of actual fault.
This curious failure to consider apportionment of back-pay liability
is also evident in Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc.2"' The plaintiffs in
Farmer were four female employees of a vending machine company
who claimed they had been discriminated against in initial placement,
promotional opportunities, seniority, and compensation. The alleged
discriminatory acts of the employer included initial promulgation of
the discriminatory hiring and promotion policies, as well as negotia-
tion of sex-based wage differentials and job classifications.204 The
union was alleged to have discriminated by participating in collective
bargaining and failing to provide fair representation to plaintiffs in
processing several grievances about the employer's actions."5 Plain-
tiffs' allegations concerning union involvement in negotiating discrimi-
natory contract provisions centered on the designation of separate job
classifications for vending machine "servicemen" and vending
machine "attendants." Female employees of ARA Services were con-
centrated in the lower-paying attendant classification, which the trial
court found to involve work comparable to that performed by service-
men, but with little opportunity for advancement or promotion.2 6 The
Eighth Circuit accepted district court findings that the union unlawful-
ly discriminated against female employees in contract negotiations by
202. Id. at 1016 (emphasis supplied) [citation deleted], quoting Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978).
203. 660 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1981).
204. Id. at 1099.
205. Id. After settling with the employees, ARA Services was dismissed from the suit.
206. Id. at 1100.
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(1) negotiating transfer and promotion provisions that perpetuated the
employer's discriminatory hiring and placement practices, and (2)
negotiating discriminatory wage differentials and compensation pack-
ages.10 Upon these findings, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision holding that the union was "jointly and severally liable
under Title VII for acquiescing in the discriminatory practices of the
employer." 08
By assessing the union back-pay liability under Title VII, the ap-
pellate court circumvented the issue of apportionment of damages for
the union's unfair representation in processing plaintiffs' grievances.
Nevertheless, the court explained:
[W]here, as in the present case, the union's breach of its statutory
duty (of fair representation) results also from its wrongful par-
ticipation in the breach of the contract or from the negotiation of
discriminatory contract provisions, then the union may be held
jointly and severally liable with the employer or its liability for
damages may be apportioned to the extent that it shares respon-
sibility for the damages.0 9
This passage indicates that the Eighth Circuit considered apportion-
ment of back-pay liability on the basis of fault appropriate in Title VII
cases and in hybrid section 301 cases when there is mutual participa-
tion in the underlying breach of contract,"' but the court clearly did
not analyze the scope of back-pay liability in terms of actual fault. The
court simply reduced the amount of union back-pay liability by the
amount of plaintiff's settlement with the employer without discussing
the relative degrees of responsibility shared by employer and union for
the discriminatory hiring, promotion, and compensation practices.'"
The inequity in imposing entire back-pay liability for discrimination
resulting from unlawful contract provisions is evident because the col-
lective bargaining relationship involves competing employer and union
interests and differing capabilities to negotiate inclusion of a desired
provision in the labor contract. Just as the unions in Seaboard212 and
207. Id. at 1103-04. The district court also held, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, that the
union breached its duty of fair representation to female employees by failing to properly explain
the contract to union membership before submitting the proposed contract for employee ratifica-
tion and by failing to fairly represent the plaintiffs during the grievance procedure. Id.
208. Id. at 1104, citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1976)
and EEOC v. Detroit-Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Utility Workers Union v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
209. Farmer, 606 F.2d at 1107.
210. But cf. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981).
Milstead is discussed supra at notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
211. Farmer, 660 F.2d at 1107.
212. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (l1th Cir. 1982).
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Farmer213 were held liable for back pay without a reduction for the
employer's initial hiring discrimination,21' so an employer's proscribed
conduct may be primarily attributable to wrongdoing by the union.
For example, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,"5 the
employer reluctantly discharged a group of black trainmen in response
to the union's threat of a strike unless the employer transferred all of
the black employees' work to an all-white bargaining unit.21 6 Although
an employer is not excused from Title VII liability for its acquiescence
to a union demand,21 7 imposing entire liability for back pay on the
employer does not take into account that its comparative fault for the
employees' loss of income is far outweighed by conduct of the union.
Similarly, when discrimination by an employer results from its
bargaining obligations with a union that maintains discriminatory
membership, hiring halls, or referral practices,2"' assessment of entire
back-pay liability to the employer exceeds any realistic degree of fault.
The same criticism made of the courts' approach to apportionment
of damages in hybrid section 301 actions may be made here: the
refusal to apportion back-pay liability according to fault ignores the
realities of the collective bargaining relationship. Although parties to a
collective bargaining agreement may be strictly liable for negotiating a
discriminatory contract provision,21 9 it does not follow that one par-
ticular party must be liable for the entire amount of any resulting
back-pay award. A more equitable approach would require scrutiny of
the collective bargaining relationship and apportionment of liability
based on the parties' relative degrees of culpability for inclusion of the
discriminatory provision in the labor contract.220
213. Farmer v. ARA Serv., 660 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1981).
214. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
215. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
216. Id. at 771. See also Sears v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1980).
217. See, e.g., Sears v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1980); Gilmore v.
Kansas City Terminal Ry., 509 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975).
218. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n, Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discriminatory work referral and membership practices), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977);
Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same); Gilmore v. Kansas City
Terminal Ry., 509 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975) (discriminatory union membership and qualification
policy).
219. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
220. Some courts have recognized the inequity of imposing entire liability on an employer or
union when there is mutual fault for the wrongdoing, but they have not apportioned back-pay
liability on the basis of fault. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v.
G.C. Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935 (1981); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Tex. 1974).
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Discrimination in Contract Administration
The strongest argument for apportionment of Title VII back-pay
liability can be made when an employee files a grievance alleging un-
fair practices by the employer and in processing or refusing to process
the grievance, the union discriminatorily breaches its duty of fair rep-
resentation. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ,221 the
Supreme Court made it clear that a union's failure to fairly represent
an employee in a disciplinary grievance is actionable under Title VII if
the union's breach of duty is attributable to unlawful motives.222
Thus, an employee who has been unfairly represented in a grievance
because of discriminatory considerations may seek relief under Title
VII or under section 301 of the LMRA. 223 Under section 301, appor-
tionment of back-pay liability is mandated by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Bowen v. United States Postal Service,22 yet in a Ti-
tle VII action involving identical injuries and wrongdoing, existing
case law indicates that the employer and the union would be jointly
liable for the entire amount of damages.2
5
The extensive overlap between hybrid section 301 cases and Title VII
contract administration cases is particularly evident in Farmer v. ARA
Services, Inc.226 Over a period of several years, the plaintiffs in Farmer
filed several grievances challenging employer conduct that allegedly
disadvantaged female employees. The objectionable practices included
the employer's improper consolidation of job functions, discrimina-
tory job assignments, and improper application of the contractual job-
bidding procedure.227 Plaintiffs' grievances repeatedly proved unsuc-
221. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
222. Id. at 284-85.
223. To date, there have been no reported allegations of a Title VII violation by an employer
as a result of an employer's nondiscriminatory contract violation and a union's subsequent
discriminatory breach of duty. This circumstance should not present adequate grounds to hold
the employer liable for a Title VII violation, but it may be argued that the employment practice
in question did not become final until conclusion of the grievance procedure and therefore the
employer's initial conduct is tainted by unlawful discrimination.
224. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
225. An examination of the circumstances giving rise to plaintiffs' respective causes of action
in Santa Fe Trail and Bowen demonstrates the parallel between hybrid § 301 actions and Title
VII actions against employer and union based upon discriminatory contract administration. The
plaintiffs in both cases had been discharged by their employers and initially sought relief through
the contractual grievance procedure. After the grievance procedure proved unavailing, the plain-
tiff in each case sued both employer and union, contending that the latter had breached its duty
of fair representation in processing the discharge grievance. In Bowen, the plaintiff sued under
§ 301, while the plaintiff in Santa Fe Trail sued under Title VII and § 1981.
226. 660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981). Farmer is discussed in connection with contract negotia-
tion cases under Title VII supra at notes 202-210 and accompanying text.
227. Id. at 1101-02.
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cessful and eventually they filed suit in federal court alleging (1) Title
VII violations by the employer and the union in negotiating the collec-
tive bargaining agreement; (2) discriminatory treatment of female
employees by the employer; and (3) breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation by the union, both as a violation of Title VII and as an ele-
ment of a section 301 action for employer breach of contract.
The union contended that plaintiffs' section 301 action was barred
for failure to exhaust contractual remedies, but the appellate court af-
firmed the lower court determination that plaintiffs were excused from
exhausting all steps of the grievance procedure on the ground of
futility.228 The union further contested substantive jurisdiction of the
federal court on the ground that plaintiffs' allegations of unfair repre-
sentation were not properly asserted under section 301. Rejecting this
argument, the Sixth Circuit simply stated that the union's duty of fair
representation is owed both before and after a labor contract is exe-
cuted.229 This statement is most properly interpreted as indicating that
unfair representation in contract negotiation gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion under Title VII, but the court's language can also be construed as
allowing section 301 actions for unfair representation in contract nego-
tiation.230 Whether this is what the Sixth Circuit intended is not certain
because the court did not explain whether the assessment of back pay
against the union was for violation of Title VII or of section 301.
The overlap-between a union's duty of fair representation in section
301 cases and under Title VII, so evident in Farmer,231 was succinctly
explained by Judge Griffin Bell in Causey v. Ford Motor Co. 232:
The union's duty of fair representation as to the processing of
grievances arises within the context of the Labor Management
Relations Act, and must be distinguished from the union's duty to
employees covered by Title VII not "otherwise to discriminate"
against members in processing grievances. The fair representation
duty under the LMRA, as enumerated in Vaca, overlaps with Title
VII protection, and the Vaca standards apply in Title VII cases.
233
228. Id. at 1106. The district court found, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that the futility of
resort to the grievance machinery was demonstrated by plaintiffs' unsuccessful filing of
grievances on prior occasions and the fact that the grievances at issue would to some extent
involve charges of misconduct against the union. Id.
229. Id.
230. Because § 301 creates a remedy for breach of contract, no § 301 liability may attach until
a collective bargaining agreement is entered into. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
231. Farmer v. ARA Serv., 660 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1981), discussed supra in text accompany-
ing notes 203-211.
232. 516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975).
233. Id. at 425 n.12 [citations omitted].
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Given this substantial overlap between union liability under section
301 and Title VII in contract administration matters, the Farmer
court's failure to identify the statutory basis for the award of back pay
against the union is understandable. After Bowen,14 union back-pay
liability under both section 301 and Title VII depends on a showing by
the employee that the union was at least in part responsible for the
employee's loss of income, and a persuasive argument can be made for
apportioning damages in Title VII contract administration cases in the
same fashion as in hybrid section 301 cases. Moreover, because
degrees of fault for discrimination against employees in contract ad-
ministration cases vary, just as in contract negotiation cases,23 the
assessment of entire liability to both union and employer is fundamen-
tally inequitable.
III. The Role of Contribution
Apportionment of liability between employer and union according
to their respective degrees of fault is necessary to minimize the
possibility of an excessive award against either defendant, but will not,
in itself, adequately protect an employer or union from paying
damages in excess of actual fault. Apportionment of liability simply
refers to the allocation of fault between union and employer, but does
not necessarily reduce either defendant's ultimate liability to the
employee. Therefore, if apportionment of liability in hybrid section
301 cases or Title VII actions involving mutual union/employer
culpability is to reduce significantly the danger that a union or an
employer will be forced to pay back pay in an amount exceeding actual
fault, there must be recourse against the other defendant. Alternative-
ly, the courts could limit the percentage of a back-pay award a plain-
tiff could collect from each defendant.236
The latter approach was rejected in the section 301 context by the
Court in Bowen:
Although the union remains primarily responsible for the portion
of damages resulting from its default, Vaca made clear that the
union's breach does not absolve the employer of liability. Thus, if
234. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
235. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
236. An extrajudicial approach to minimizing the risk that an employer or a union will have
to pay back pay in excess of actual fault is negotiation of an indemnity clause into the labor
contract. One commentator has suggested that this is the "only meaningful defense" an
employer can raise to avoid excessive liability for the union's breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation. Edwards, Employers' Liability for Union Unfair Representation: Fiduciary Duty or
Bargaining Reality?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686. 690-91 (1976).
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the petitioner in this case does not collect the damages appor-
tioned against the union, the Service remains secondarily liable for
the full loss of backpay.
237
Unfortunately, the Court did not state whether an employer who pays
the union's share of back pay has a right of contribution against the
union.2 38 This right must be presumed, however, in order to give
meaning to the Court's apportionment of back-pay liability between
employer and union on the basis of fault.239
In contrast, the Supreme Court affirmatively rejected any right to
contribution in Title VII actions when there is mutual employer and
237. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 595 n.12 (1983).
238. Because unions have historically been spared back-pay liability in § 301 cases, there is
very little case law elaborating on the availability of contribution under § 301.
239. In addition, analysis of the LMRA supports the existence of an implied right to contribu-
tion in hybrid § 301 actions. In Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77
(1981), the Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered approach to determining when an implied right
to contribution exists in private causes of action under a particular federal statute. First, the
court must analyze the statutory language and the legislative history to determine whether a right
to contribution was within the scope of legislative intent. If so, the court must determine whether
the elements of a typical contribution claim are present in the statutory scheme.
The first question, whether a right of contribution was within the scope of legislative intent,
can be answered in the affirmative. In Northwest Airlines, the Court emphasized the importance
of determining the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Id. at 91-92. If the party seek-
ing contribution is within the benefited class, presumably Congress would extend a right to con-
tribution to that party. Section 301 provides a cause of action for breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement and was clearly intended for the benefit of employers and unions. Moreover, the
union's breach of duty to the employee constitutes a separate wrong against the employer in the
sense that the contractual grievance procedure is undermined. See Bowen v. United States Postal
Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 595 (1983). In the absence of any expression of intent in the LMRA or its
legislative history to the contrary, the fact that § 301 was created for the benefit of signatories to
a labor contract strongly suggests that a right of contribution is within the scope of legislative in-
tent.
The second stage of analysis, whether the elements of a typical contribution claim are present,
also supports the existence of a right to contribution in hybrid § 301 actions. First, in light of
Bowen, an employee may clearly recover from the union and employer in § 301 actions. Second,
there must be a finding of wrongdoing by both employer and union for § 301 liability to attach
in favor of an employee and thus there will in all cases be mutual employer and union respon-
sibility for the employee's loss of income. Third, an employer is aggrieved by the union's wrong-
doing in § 301 actions because the union's conduct removes a bar to the employee's lawsuit and
the union's breach caused the grievance process to malfunction. Whether the union in a hybrid
§ 301 action is an aggrieved party is unclear because the employer's breach of contract theoreti-
cally affects only the employee, while the union's breach of its duty of fair representation affects
the employer by undermining the grievance procedure. Finally, there are no meaningful policy
considerations militating against a right to contribution under § 301. Since the prevailing
employee will be entitled to compensation for the entire amount of lost income in all cases, the
policies of equity and deterrence strongly suggest that the unions and employers should only be
required to pay the amount of damages attributable to their wrongdoing. For a general discus-
sion of the elements of a right to contribution, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(A)
(1979). See also Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-91 (1981).
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union fault in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union.240
Northwest Airlines' claim for contribution arose out of a 1973 judg-
ment against the airline for the maintenance of sex-biased wage dif-
ferentials.2' Since the wage differentials were fixed by collective
bargaining agreements with the Transport Workers Union and the Air
Line Pilots Association, Northwest filed motions asserting claims for
contribution and indemnity against the unions after the entry of judg-
ment.24 2 These motions were denied as untimely,2 43 and subsequently
Northwest commenced a separate action against the unions praying
that the unions be required to pay a portion of the $20 million plus
judgment against the airline.
In its complaint, Northwest claimed a common law right to con-
tribution against the unions under Title VII for causing it to discrimi-
nate against the class of female employees.214  The unions moved to
dismiss Northwest's complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
but their motion was denied. In determining that a federal right to
contribution existed in Title VII actions, the district court noted:
(1) The airline had alleged common liability;
(2) Northwest had alleged it had been required to pay more than its
just share of an award;
(3) There was a trend in federal law favoring contribution; and
(4) The policies of Title VII would be served by allowing contribu-
tion. 4 '
An interlocutory appeal was taken by the unions, but the Eighth
Circuit declined to reach the Title VII issue on the ground that it could
be rendered moot by resolving the union's defense of laches asserted
for the first time on appeal.246
Rather than returning to the district court for a decision on the
laches issue, however, Northwest Airlines filed a petition for writ of
certiorari requesting the Supreme Court to resolve the underlying legal
240. 451 U.S. 77 (1981). See supra note 239 for a discussion of the Northwest Airlines'
approach to determining whether there is an implied right to contribution under a particular
federal statute.
241. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 567 F.2d 429
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
242. The ALPA was a defendent in Laffey solely to assure that plaintiffs would receive full
relief. No allegations of discriminatory conduct were made against the union. See Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
243. 567 F.2d at 476-78.
244. Northwest also claimed both a federal common law and implied statutory right of con-
tribution under the Equal Pay Act. As previously discussed, Northwest was wholly unsuccessful
in its claim for contribution under the EPA. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
245. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1981).
246. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 606 F.2d 1350, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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issues. The Supreme Court granted certiorari,24 7 and, in its decision on
the merits, explained that its consideration of a right to contribution
under Title VII would encompass the federal common law theory as-
serted by Northwest, as well as an implied statutory theory that had
not been raised by Northwest in connection with its Title VII claim.24"
In a unanimous decision,249 the Court held that neither theory sup-
ported the existence of a right to contribution in Title VII actions.
According to the Court, a cause of action for contribution could not
be derived from the statute because Congress did not intend to protect
employer concerns. Rather, by enacting Title VII, Congress intended
to regulate the conduct of employers solely for the benefit of
employees.2"' Section 703(c)(3) of Title VII, 251 proscribing union ef-
forts to cause employer discrimination, was rejected as evincing con-
gressional intent to create a right to contribution because this section
was designed for the exclusive protection of employees.252 By holding
that contribution was not within the realm of legislative intent in en-
acting Title VII, the Court did not need to determine whether the tra-
ditional elements of a claim to contribution were present.1
3
Northwest's claim that contribution exists as a matter of federal
common law was rejected on more general grounds. In light of Title
VII's "comprehensive legislative scheme," the Court reasoned that it
would be inappropriate for the judiciary to fashion a remedy not ex-
pressly provided by statute.2 54 The Court acknowledged that equitable
considerations supported Northwest's claim to contribution, but de-
ferred to Congress as the proper authority for expanding Title VII's
remedial scheme.
25
Since the decision in Northwest Airlines, there has been no move-
ment in Congress to establish an express right of contribution under
Title VII. Unless this gap in Title VII is filled, however, there will re-
main a significant danger in all Title VII actions when there is mutual
liability that the employer or the union will pay a disproportionate
247. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 445 U.S. 902 (1980).
248. The Supreme Court explained its ability to go beyond plaintiff's pleadings at note 15,
451 U.S. at 86.
249. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision.
250. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 92.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1982).
252. 451 U.S. at 92-93.
253. For a discussion of the elements of a typical claim to contribution, see supra note 239.
254. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97-98.
255. Id. at 98. In an analogous 1981 case, the Supreme Court found no common law or
implied statutory right to contribution in private antitrust actions. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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share of the back-pay award.26 The courts could avoid this inequity
by limiting each defendant's total exposure to its proportionate share
of liability, but this would conflict with the compensatory purpose of
Title VII. 2"1 Another means of limiting the inequities engendered by
Northwest Airlines is the negotiation of indemnity clauses into collec-
tive bargaining agreements.28 There is little incentive for unions to
agree to the inclusion of an indemnity clause in the contract,259 how-
ever, and in no circumstances could the employer insist that indemnity
be made part of the contract.260 Accordingly, in the absence of con-
gressional action, employers and unions will in all probability remain
vulnerable to back-pay liability primarily or partially attributable to
discriminatory conduct by the other party to the labor contract.26" '
Conclusion
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service,262 the Supreme Court held
that back-pay liability in actions under section 301 is apportionable be-
tween unions and employers according to fault. The same principles of
256. In most cases, the employer will face the greater risk of paying an excessive share of
damages because the employer is usually more liquid than the union and employees are
understandably reluctant to seek damages from their own union.
257. The Court's refusal in Bowen to limit an employee's right to collect damages from a
defendant to an amount representing that defendant's relative fault in section 301 actions
indicates that a Title VII plaintiff could also collect damages from a defendant union or
employer in excess of actual fault. The unavailability of contribution in Title VII actions pro-
bably would not be considered a meaningful distinction since the ultimate concern in both
statutes is to afford employees full relief.
258. See Edwards, Employers' Liability For Union Unfair Representation: Fiduciary Duty or
Bargaining Reality?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686 (1976).
259. As discussed supra note 256, more often than not employees pursue the right to back pay
only against the employer. This, coupled with limited financial resources of local unions, pro-
vides a strong disincentive for unions to assent to an indemnity clause. Another reason for
unions to resist inclusion of an indemnity clause in the contract is that such clauses do little to
improve working conditions for union members. On the other hand, if the union believes that an
unrelated contract provision by the employer could result in Title VII liability, it might be in-
terested in including an indemnity clause in the contract.
260. Under § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, an employer commits an unfair
labor practice by insisting on inclusion of a contract provision that is not related to "wages,
terms or conditions of employment." Unions are also proscribed from insisting on these
"nonmandatory" provisions by § 8(b)(3) of the Act. See generally GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW 498-529 (1976).
261. In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (holding that there is no federal common law or implied
statutory right to contribution in private antitrust actions) sparked immediate action in
Congress. Currently, S.B. 380, authored by Senators Laxalt and De Concini and sponsored by
Senators Hatch and Thurmond, is pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. If enacted
into law, S.B. 380 would permit contribution and claims reduction among codefendants in civil
actions for violation of federal antitrust laws.
262. 103 S. Ct. 388 (1983).
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equity warranting apportionment of back-pay liability under section
301 are present in cases under the federal antidiscrimination laws when
employers and unions are mutually at fault. Therefore, federal courts
hearing employment discrimination cases involving both union and
employer liability should follow Bowen and apportion back-pay liabil-
ity on the basis of fault. Moreover, to effectuate the purposes of ap-
portionment and to preserve the goal of full compensation to victims
of wrongful discrimination, Congress should overrule Northwest Air-
lines v. Transport Workers Union263 and create an express statutory
right to contribution under the federal antidiscrimination laws.
263. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
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